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Following William James’ advice, in my short reply I will try to be “mindful of the 
scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction.” 
Therefore, I will address Plumer’s comments by distinguishing between different 
meanings of the term “conclusion” and, by extension, “rational results” in argumentation 
theory.  
  The primary distinction is between the way arguers ? @ A B ? C C D @ E F @ C B G H  their daily 
disputes and the way argumentation scholars think disputes I J E B C G K H @ E F @ C B G H G , 
according to certain standards of rationality. The latter, i.e., normative approach is 
preoccupied with the question: “what counts as a rational conclusion of argumentation?” 
From a variety of proposed answers, I mention but two pertinent to this discussion.  
Firstly, rational conclusion may be defined as an outcome of sound 
argumentation, that is, of application of valid forms of inference to true premises. This is 
the rational ideal of Aristotelian demonstration and mathematical (logical) proofs. Such 
requirements, taken to natural sciences by logical positivists, mean that conclusions of 
science are rational only if verifiable and thus certain—they are built of elementary facts 
described in observational terms and approved methods of reasoning (whether they are 
deductively valid or, at least, inductively solid). Conclusions which cannot be based on 
verifiable facts and valid methodologies belong to the domain of poetry rather than 
reasoning and thus constitute “pseudoproblems in philosophy,” as Carnap famously 
declared. 
However, as we know from works of Popper, Quine, Kuhn or Feyerabend, such 
standards for rational conclusions proved to be set too high, even for hard sciences. In his 
solution to this problem, Popper posits that science, rather than being a domain of facts 
and proofs, consists of “conjectures and refutations.” Hence, rational conclusion is one 
that endures attempts at falsification: after being submitted to critical testing, it still holds. 
This is the sense of a rational conclusion adopted by pragma-dialectics.
1
     
Finally, descriptively oriented researchers seek to find out “how people actually 
conclude their argumentation?” Depending on the level of institutionalisation of the type 

1 Krabbe (2007b) provides a particularly illuminating account of the notion of conclusion in pragma-
dialectics.  
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of activity in which argumentation takes place in real life, (political) disputes can be 
terminated by anything from “I hereby announce the passage by the Senate of the 
following bill” to “maybe you’re right, but I gotta run now to catch a train.” 
My study sets out to make claims on the two latter levels—it employs a critical 
normative theory to account for phenomenon of inconclusiveness actually experienced in 
online discussions. That is the reason why, as Plumer rightly supposes, criticisms of 
relevance are prominent, even if logically speaking they may be “irrelevant.” That is also 
the reason why I do not find my analyses as confusing rationality with certitude. Without 
looking for hard, full-proof grounds a pragmatic dialectician can still claim that 
irrespective of the subject matter discussions may be concluded (and even concluded 
rationally): L E C M A M @ ? C  discussions in parliaments and city councils ? N H  terminated, and 
usually in an ordered fashion. Further, the possible trade-off between ever open critical 
testing and concluding of disputes is inscribed into critical, dialectical approaches; that is 
why, as I stress in the paper, the endpoint should always be seen as “a tentative 
conclusion, given the circumstances of a particular discussion.” Finally, what I am 
concerned with are “rational results” in terms of a functional, pragmatic theory of 
argumentation: various other benefits for arguers, such as honing their argumentation 
skills, are beyond my analyses just as much as is someone’s intellectual satisfaction from 
reading these discussions.  
Somewhat paradoxically, then, focused on so specified dialectical account of the 
rationality of online discussions I still find them highly critical and useful venues for 
argumentation: “even if endless, such discussions are not completely fruitless.” This is in 
sharp contrast to Plumer who, in a Platonic gesture, seems to be willing to exclude online 
discussants from the Republic of “informed and skilful arguers.” Such exclusion is, again, 
against the spirit of the critical principle, according to which argumentation is worthwhile 
as soon (and as long) as critical testing, that is the back-and-forth of conjectures and 
refutations, is exercised. And this, as I tried to show in my analyses, is the case with 
online political discussions.   
 
Link to commentary        Link to paper 
 
